PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE

SOME REMARKS ON BENNETT & HACKER’S PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE

  • Marcelo Carvalho Universidade Federal de São Paulo

Abstract

The use of psychological concepts in cognitive neuroscience is heavily criticized by Bennett & Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The central objection points to neuroscience's attribution to the brain of psychological concepts that are meaningful only when applied to the entire being. That is supposedly the case of “seeing,” “communicating,” and “reading.” Bennett & Hacker identify in such attributions what they call a mereological fallacy. The critical revision of Bennett & Hacker's argument is an opportunity to present the debate about philosophy and psychological neuroscience and outline a Wittgensteinian perspective about the meaning of psychological concepts, its interest, and its relevance to scientific research.

Published
2020-06-05
How to Cite
Carvalho, M. (2020). PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: SOME REMARKS ON BENNETT & HACKER’S PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE. Prometheus - Journal of Philosophy, 12(33). Retrieved from https://seer.ufs.br/index.php/prometeus/article/view/13808
Section
Dossiê Linguagem e Cognição