LINGUAGEM E ENATIVISMO

UMA RESPOSTA NORMATIVA PARA A OBJEÇÃO DE ESCOPO E O PROBLEMA DIFÍCIL DO CON-TEÚDO

  • Marcos Silva Departamento de Filosofia (UFPE/CNPq)
  • Iana Cavalcanti Mestranda em Filosofia (UFPE)
  • Hugo Mota Mestrando em Filosofia (UFPE)

Abstract

Language does not have to be held as a problem for radical enactivists. The scope objection usually presented to criticize enactivist explanations is a problem only if we have a referentialist and representationalist view of the nature of language. Here we present a normative hypothesis for the great question concerning the hard problem of content, namely, on how linguistic practices develop from minds without content. We carry representational content when we master inferential relations and we master inferential relations when we master normative relations, especially when we are introduced into frameworks of authorizations and prohibitions. Inspired by the anti-intellectualism of the later Wittgenstein and Brandom’s inferentialism, we present the hypothesis that language emerges from inferentially articulated action from normative elements and not from manipulation in internal mental states of contents fixed by reference to external things.

Published
2020-06-05
How to Cite
Silva, M., Cavalcanti, I., & Mota, H. (2020). LINGUAGEM E ENATIVISMO : UMA RESPOSTA NORMATIVA PARA A OBJEÇÃO DE ESCOPO E O PROBLEMA DIFÍCIL DO CON-TEÚDO. Prometheus - Journal of Philosophy, 12(33). Retrieved from https://seer.ufs.br/index.php/prometeus/article/view/13811
Section
Dossiê Linguagem e Cognição