



### 3. A Typology of Social Media Crises

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Social media crisis management is a nascent area. Currently no systematic research exists on how to categorize and manage social media crises. In this chapter I propose a typology of social media crises. My typology divides crises along two dimensions: controllability and shock value of the trigger. I don't assert that this is the best typology for social media crises. While writing this chapter, I attempted several different typologies and found this one more useful. However, in the absence of any quantitative research, I claim neither superiority nor completeness of my proposed typology. Nonetheless, I hope that my writing will lead to more interest in researching a scientifically rigorous classification of social media crises. I use several examples from the corporate world where big brands with large advertising and PR budgets bit the dust. The allure of social media makes many blind to the risks that come with their use. Again, I hope that this writing triggers more interest in assessing these risks better and providing managers a tool for estimating the return on social media investments.

Keywords: social networks- administration -business risk.

A administração da crise das redes sociais é uma área recente. Não existe ainda uma pesquisa sistêmica sobre a classificação e administração das crises das redes sociais. Neste capítulo eu proponho uma classificação das crises das redes sociais. Minha classificação divide as crises em duas dimensões: capacidade de controle e o grau de impacto do agente causador. Eu não posso afirmar que esta seja a melhor classificação para as crises das redes sociais. Enquanto escrevia este capítulo, eu testei diferentes classificações e achei que esta é a mais útil. Contudo, na ausência de uma pesquisa quantitativa, eu não alego que a classificação que eu propus seja superior ou completa. Mas, espero que meu texto aumente o interesse na pesquisa de uma classificação cientificamente mais rigorosa das crises das redes sociais. Uso vários exemplos do mundo empresarial em que grandes marcas com bons orçamentos para propaganda e relações públicas sofreram perdas. A tentação do uso das redes sociais faz com que muitos esqueçam dos riscos inerentes ao seu uso. Novamente, eu espero que este texto



gere mais interesse numa avaliação melhor destes riscos e seja uma ferramenta para os administradores estimarem o retorno dos investimentos nas redes sociais.

Palavras-chave: redes sociais – administração – risco empresarial.

Increasingly social media are gaining importance in every walk of our lives. Facebook, undoubtedly the most popular social network across the world, now has more than 800 million monthly active users<sup>II</sup>. Other social networking services such as Google Plus, Twitter, and YouTube each has millions of users. People spend a large amount of time on social media everyday, leaving a trail of their actions on the social networking Websites. The photos they share with their friends, the articles they “Like” on Facebook, the videos they watch on YouTube, and the links they “Tweet” to their followers, all add up to the growing repository of their personal information with the social networking sites. Facebook and others have wealth of data about almost every aspect of their users’ lives. No wonder many companies are interested in efficiently targeting customers based on their behavioral characteristics. More and more firms globally are adopting social media strategies. To get closer to their customers, many companies are engaging with their consumers on different social networks.

One of the key benefits of using social media marketing is the two-way communication that firms can have with their consumers. Consumers like it because they can engage in conversations with the brands they buy. They can complain about their bad experiences or compliment the brands on good ones. On the other hand, firms value engaging on social media because such engagement presents them with an opportunity to satisfy consumer queries immediately, show the firm’s human side, and gather instant feedback. For example, Dell uses Twitter very effectively to handle its customer service. Similarly Old Spice created an advertising campaign exclusively on YouTube. It is now one of the most successful social media campaigns of all times.

Whereas social media has created valuable benefits for firms, they have also introduced a key drawback. The increased efficiency of communication and intimacy with consumers come at the cost of higher riskiness of the business. Users can share an article, video, or photograph with their social network at the click of a button, thus spreading a firm’s content “virally,” generating wide visibility instantaneously. Exactly the same way, users can harm firms by sharing bad experiences, rumors, or events that were pure accidents. The little accountability



on the Internet puts firms in a tight spot. There is no moderator on the social networks who monitors the flow on the information super highway.

In the past five years, several companies have faced serious crises erupting right in front of their eyes. Social media crises flare up quickly and spread at the speed of light. The same viral nature of social medium that makes it so attractive to firms also makes it lethal and risky. Although a large amount of literature exists on managing crises, little systematic knowledge prevails on handling crises on social media. The lack of understanding is generally due to the newness of social media and also due to the wide range of ways in which crises can develop. In this chapter I attempt to summarize the different social media crises and create a typology. Next, drawing upon the academic and practitioner literature, I propose effective strategies for battling these crises.

### **Towards A Typology of Social Media Crises**

There are several ways in which one can group social media crises. An intuitive criterion for categorization can be the type of social medium. Whether the crisis emerged on Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube certainly calls for different strategies to address and contain the crisis. For example, a video on YouTube can be much more powerful in conveying a message as compared to a Tweet. Although a valid categorization, such grouping also assumes that different social media are independent. But it's not the case. Crisis can spread from one network to another quickly. Something that started on Facebook can be shared with others on Google Plus or Twitter. A YouTube video may generate more discussion on Facebook rather than on YouTube. Therefore, identifying crisis by the social medium on which it was initiated does not seem appropriate.

I rely on a relatively recent and comprehensive typology of crises proposed by Gundel (2005) in order to develop a typology of social media crises. Gundel (2005) categorized crises into four types based on their predictability (high vs. low) and controllability (high vs. low). He puts an emphasis on predictability because, in general, organizations can design measures to proactively eliminate a crisis or at least prepare the response to a crisis based on its predictability. However, when we confine our discussion to the crises initiated or unfolding on social media, consideration of predictability becomes less critical. I argue that due to its open and viral nature, social media make crises almost unpredictable. Therefore, although organizations can put in place measures to avoid crisis-like situations, the predictability of the



time, place, or the nature of crisis is almost zero. The prediction is complicated additionally by the global nature of social media, which transcend not only geographical but also cultural boundaries. The fashion designer and businessman Kenneth Cole learned this the hard way, when he Tweeted an insensitive message about Arab Spring<sup>III</sup>.

Another possible reason for low predictability of social media crises is the lack of in-depth understanding among organizations about the way social media work. Many companies still perceive social media marketing a nascent area not worthy of large investments. This underinvestment leads to two related problems. First, the employees handling social media have little resources or incentives to systematically analyze the crises that have been taking place regularly. In a 2009 survey of more than 400 American firms, advertising agency Russell Herder found that most companies didn't have best practices for social media. Such apathy is likely to make it difficult for such firms to predict social media crises. Second, lack of resources also leads to relatively small social media teams, which in some cases handle momentous amount of data. Jeremiah Owyang of Web consultancy Altimeter reports<sup>IV</sup> that on average corporate social media teams consist of 11 persons typically sharing four tasks: leadership and vision, communicating with and educating other business units, customer engagement, and program management. Such teams might be overburdened to systematically analyze and predict possible crises-like situations. Therefore, I avoid using predictability as a basis for categorizing social media crises.

Controllability is a critical factor for general crisis management as well as specifically for social media. Crises with low controllability are dangerous and can scar the credibility of the firms for a long time. In social media, due to the seeming permanence of content on the Internet, long-term impact of even a small mistake is magnified. Controversial articles that were yanked from the original websites remain alive on several blogs which display all or part of the original content. Rogue Tweets that jeopardized multi-million dollar marketing campaigns can be deleted immediately, but its screenshots taken and shared by enthusiastic Twitter followers remain on the Web for years to come.

Although *prima facie* it seems that all social media crises have low controllability, it is not necessarily true. A few companies have averted their crisis-like situations from turning into full-blown crises. For example, when a Red Cross social media strategist by mistake posted a Tweet about alcohol on the official Red Cross Twitter account, Red Cross not only removed



that Tweet quickly but also offered a witty comment on the fiasco, thereby making light of the situation. Such incidences are not outliers and in a few situations, social media crises can indeed have high level of controllability.

The effort an organization needs to put in controlling a social media crisis may vary across different crises. For example, in case of Red Cross it was relatively easier to control the emerging crisis. However, in case of Kenneth Cole, who Tweeted to his followers that the Arab spring was just a response to amazing discounts Kenneth Cole was offering, the efforts required in controlling the crisis were not trivial. I must point out that in case of Kenneth Cole's situation the controllability of the crisis situation still remained high. This is because the Tweet was originated from one person, Kenneth Cole, who would later apologize to the public and change the course. It, nonetheless, demanded much more effort in extinguishing the fire because the Tweet had spread in the social media extensively.

It is critical to understand the difference between the two constructs: ease of control and the degree of controllability. In some cases, the overall controllability of the crisis can be low. Within that set of cases, a few crises can be managed, to whatever limited extent, with less effort while the rest may require more effort. I will use two examples to illustrate this point. United Airlines, a US-based airline, faced a major crisis when one of its disgruntled passengers, Dave Carroll, recorded a parody song titled “United Breaks Guitars” and shared it on YouTube. The song became an instant hit, garnering millions of views quickly. Carroll, a Canadian musician, recorded and shared two more songs about United. United was a little slow to react, which made matters worse because meanwhile the traditional media such as TV and radio also picked up the story taking it into millions of American homes. Overall this was a situation with very low controllability from United's stand point.

United could have still attempted to manage the crisis with relatively less effort. The reason Carroll made the video because United Air baggage handlers broke his guitar and later United staff refused to pay for the repairs, which amounted to \$1,200. Considering the triviality of the amount involved in this crisis, it was relatively a low cost solution for United to offer the money to Carroll and control the crisis to some extent. Of course, there was no guarantee that Carroll would have refrained from sharing his song on YouTube after getting the repair money. In one interview he told the news channel that he was emotionally attached to his guitar and even after the repairs it didn't sound as good as before. Thus, in this situation, there



was little United could do to control the situation from getting out of the hands and becoming a crisis. Nonetheless, they could have easily averted additional negative publicity by reimbursing Carroll for his troubles.

The automobile manufacturer Chrysler found itself in a similarly difficult situation where the controllability of crisis was quite low. During the 2011 Superbowl, a major American sporting event that is watched by millions on the TV, Chrysler launched an advertising campaign around the theme of patriotism, American values, and in particular its origins in Detroit, the city where large US automobile manufacturers have headquarters. Chrysler hired the popular rapper Eminem and aired a two-minute commercial during the Superbowl. The advertisement was part of a multi-million dollar campaign Chrysler launched while promoting Detroit as a “Motor City.”

Immediately after this ad campaign, one of the employees working for Chrysler’s contracted social media marketing agency erroneously Tweeted from the official Chrysler account that while Detroit was a Motor City, nobody there seemed to know how to drive. This Tweet also had a curse word which made the communication particularly obnoxious. Within minutes, if not seconds, the Tweet was pulled off. However, by then social media community members had already taken screenshots of the offensive Tweet. Today, although this Tweet doesn’t exist on official Chrysler Twitter feed, it lives on hundreds of blogs that reported and discussed this story. As far as the controllability of this crisis is concerned, Chrysler found itself in as bad a situation as United Airlines. However, Chrysler faced a much tougher task to control even the little bit it could control. Unlike United, in this case, Chrysler was not in a position to simply pay its way out. Unlike Kenneth Cole, it could not quickly apologize and put blame on one person. It is very likely people will think that the person Chrysler blamed was just a scapegoat. Overall, Chrysler faced a crisis that had low controllability and required high effort to control whatever Chrysler could control.

Whereas Red Cross and Kenneth Cole both faced crises with high levels of controllability, each crisis required different level of effort to control. For Red Cross control was relatively easy but for Kenneth Cole it was difficult. Similarly, United Airline and Chrysler faced crises with low levels of controllability. But United could exercise its limited control with relatively less effort while Chrysler needed extensive effort. This raises a question: What determines the ease of control in a social media crisis?



I propose that a second criterion for categorization of social media crises determines the ease of control. From the various examples that I have examined, it appears that the shock value of the trigger that started the crisis can, to some extent, explain the ease of controlling the crisis. Simply put, more the shock value of the trigger, more difficult it is to control the crisis. I must clarify that without any systematic, large scale study, it is difficult to say to what extent shock value explains the ease of control. However, given the exploratory nature of this chapter, I would like to propose this as a potential explanation. The available cases fit into the pattern to a great extent giving at least face validity to my proposal.

### **Constructing Typology of Social Media Crises**

As discussed above, I use two dimensions for categorizing social media crises. Controllability, the first dimension, is based on Gundel (2005). I define controllability as follows:

***Controllability:** A social media crisis is controllable if responses to limit or eliminate the crisis by influencing its causes are known as well as executable.*

As discussed earlier, controllability can be high or low. Further, the effort required to control a crisis can also be high or low. This effort, as I argue, is a function of shock value of the trigger. The shock value of the trigger refers to the extent to which a crisis-triggering incidence offended the social media community. A single event can shock masses differently depending on the context. For example, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) show that when a crime is committed by a security personnel, who is supposed to prevent the crime, experimental subjects tend to award longer prison sentences as compared to when the crime is committed by a person without any obligation to prevent crime. However, ultimately a crime has the same severity irrespective of who commits it. Nonetheless, people feel betrayed and therefore shocked when the person who is supposed to stop the crime commits it. Thus, shock value depends not only on the nature of trigger but also on the context. For example, a Tweet from McDonald's making fun of slaughtering cows is likely to have less shock value as compared to the same Tweet by PETA. Similarly, Kenneth Cole's Tweet making fun of Arab Spring is likely to have much less shock value if it were communicated well after Arab uprising was over.

Based on this discussion I offer following definition of shock value of trigger.



***Shock value of trigger:** Shock value refers to the degree to which an incident that is embedded in the context and time offends members of the social media community.*

It is worth mentioning that the shock value of the trigger can't be isolated from the context and time. This makes the predictability of social media crisis even more difficult. For example, PayPal has a reputation for designing tough rules for payments. PayPal defends such strict measures by pointing to large scale frauds happening on the Internet commerce all the time. It is likely that merchants affected by PayPal's actions take refuge on the social media to vent their frustration with PayPal. Usually the probability that such complaints will turn into a crisis is really small.

In 2011 around the Christmas time, PayPal spotted that a certain merchant [www.regreetsy.com](http://www.regreetsy.com) was generating sales more rapidly than it would usually do. PayPal's system flagged the merchant and took objection to the merchant's use of "Donate" button, which the merchant had used by mistake. PayPal froze the merchant's accounts and also forced them to refund the buyers. However, Regreetsy had been using PayPal for about a decade and were hardly a fly-by-night operator. They were going to use the proceeds from the sales to help poor families and their children for Christmas. In a blog post, the owner of Regreetsy explained the situation, which generated a huge backlash against PayPal. The story was picked up by the influential blog Consumerist<sup>V</sup>, which helped spread the word even more. For the next three days, PayPal was facing more and more wrath on the social media. Finally on the fourth day, PayPal decided to back off and apologize for its actions. This incident shows that the shock value of the trigger depends on the context and time. Christmas was the worst time to take action against a merchant that might have a motive to help poor families. However, for PayPal it is almost impossible to predict this crisis because the merchant's philanthropic motive might be implicit and never disclosed to PayPal.

Based on whether a crisis has high or low levels of controllability and high or low levels of shock value of the trigger, I divide crises into four categories. Figure 1 depicts four classes of crises: soft, firefighting, wait and watch, and disasters. Next I explain each of the four types of social media crises in depth. In the final section I conclude this chapter by briefly suggesting solutions to control the crises under these scenarios.

## Types of Crises





**Soft Crises:** Soft crises have high level of controllability and low levels of shock value. In other words, they are most likely not the crises every business is scared of. However, just because a crisis is a soft crisis doesn't make it trivial. Remember that we are still talking about identifying the crises and not how to tackle them. Therefore, if a soft crisis goes unattended, it is likely to turn into a full-blown crisis soon. It is critical to isolate the classification and the response at this stage.

The most celebrated example of a soft crisis is the rogue Tweet by an employee of American Red Cross. In February 2011, Gloria Huang, a Red Cross social media specialist Tweeted: “Ryan found two more 4 bottle packs of Dogfish Head’s Midas Touch beer... when we drink we do it right #getngslizzerd.” Such a blatant reference of alcohol in Red Cross official Tweet was really shocking for many people. However, its overall shock value was relatively less considering that the Tweet didn’t abuse anyone or used foul language. Nonetheless, for a nonprofit organization that focuses so much on human sufferings and that continuously runs several blood donation drives, talking about drinking beer was certainly a trigger for a crisis! The rogue Tweet was actually an accident and was sent using social media dashboard Hoot Suite, which enables users to link multiple social media accounts to one dashboard. For example, one can link their personal and professional Twitter accounts and manage them from the same space rather than switching between different accounts. Hoot Suite is now one of the most popular social media dashboards. However, it also increases the chance that people will inadvertently share personal information on their work-related social media. Gloria Huang showed the same callousness. In response, Red Cross pulled out the offensive Tweet and responded with this witty Tweet: “We’ve deleted the rogue Tweet but rest assured the Red Cross is sober and we have confiscated the keys.” Gloria Huang also apologized on her personal Twitter account, while owning the responsibility for the slip up.

This was a soft crisis not because everything ended well for Red Cross. It was soft because, 1) the original Tweet was offensive but still with relatively low shock value and 2) a clarification on the origin of the Tweet was sufficient for dissipating the tension in the social media. That the Red Cross employees think about drinking beer after their day’s work was not a real shock to anyone. But the Tweet made it sound as if the employees were going to drink while on the work! Once that impression was removed, the crisis was under control.



**Firefighting:** The crises that are highly controllable but also have a high shock value of trigger fall into “Firefighting” category. These are the crises that organizations should watch for and be wary about. Historically we see that most tend to take them lightly or don’t know how to respond. The controllability is high, which means that the crisis-like situation can be improved and stopped from turning into a full-blown crisis. However, the high shock value may overwhelm the social media strategists and they might lose out on the opportunity to control the crisis.

One of the most celebrated examples of a firefighting crisis turning into a disaster is American actor Ashton Kutcher’s November 2011 Tweet stream regarding firing of Penn State Football team coach Joe Paterno. Ashton Kutcher, who had more than 8 million Twitter followers, told his followers that he was very disappointed in the firing and thought that the whole incident had no class. What Kutcher did not know was that Paterno was fired because of his inaction in child rape cases at Penn State men’s locker room. Such inaction meant that Paterno was ignorant, perhaps on purpose, about the hideous crime. Kutcher drew a huge backlash against his Tweet. His followers called him names and suggested that Kutcher was supporting a “pedophile.<sup>Vb</sup>” (Note that Paterno himself was never charged with any crime nor did anyone accuse him of participating in the crime.)

Ashton Kutcher’s image was badly bruised after this Tweet. It ruined his reputation as a person who supports crimes against children. Kutcher used to take pride in this reputation. He immediately decided to stop engaging directly with his Twitter fans and followers and instead outsourced such engagement to a company Katalyst Media.

This incident was an example of firefighting crisis. The trigger, the offending Tweet, was highly shocking to the social media community. However, Kutcher could have controlled the crisis before it became so wide spread. Perhaps the most critical thing for the controllability was to have managers like Katalyst Media already assigned to his Twitter account. Since he had around 8 million followers, the Tweet became viral very quickly. In the hindsight, it is surprising to see that one person, a busy celebrity, insisted on communicating with the followers on one-to-one basis, thereby exposing him to a crisis so easily. The crisis was controllable because Kutcher could have put in place a system to tackle such situations. Rogue Tweets are bound to slip through; it is unavoidable. Kutcher, used this same logic while announcing the handover of his Twitter account to Katalyst Media, perhaps a bit too late.



**Wait and watch:** As the name suggests, wait and watch crises ask for patience and thick skin. These crises are caused by less shocking triggers unlike Ashton Kutcher’s Tweet. However, they have very low controllability. The crisis becomes viral quickly, spreads from one social network to another and turns into a large avalanche. The more the organization responds to the crisis, more likely it is to become a disaster. Therefore, for such crises wait and watch is the best policy.

Earlier described example of United Airlines in the introduction is a perfect example of a wait and watch crisis. Dave Carroll, the Canadian musician, created and shared a song titled “United Breaks Guitars” on YouTube in July 2009. In this song, Carroll and his band narrate an experience about how United baggage handlers broke Carroll’s Taylor guitar and the United customer service staff refused to help. The song was hardly shocking. But it had a huge amusement value, which made the song go viral. To date the song has been viewed more than 11.5 million times!

United later tried to pay for repairing the guitar. Carroll, by this time emboldened by the support and attention he received worldwide, refused to accept the money and instead asked United to give it to a charity. Although with the advantage of hindsight one can say that it was not a good strategy for United, in reality, any action from United could have made the situation worse. There was little, if anything, that United could do to diffuse the controversy and the negative publicity it generated. Besides, the song really didn’t reveal any new fact about United or any other US airline’s horrible customer service. People not only knew this but also they have more or less accepted bad customer service from American airlines. Nonetheless, it was a huge negative publicity for United Airlines. But United faced a crisis where controllability was very low. When your business strategy is to have low levels of customer service, how can you stop people from complaining about it?

**Disaster:** The last category of social media crises is disasters. These are highly uncontrollable and shocking crises situations. They can break organizations. In the recent years, few companies faced this situation as vividly as Domino’s Pizza.<sup>VII</sup> In April 2009, two Domino’s Pizza employees recorded themselves tainting food in a North Carolina, USA facility run by Domino’s franchisee. Their video became viral in no time. Since the two employees had used their own YouTube account to upload the videos, it was easy for journalists to track them



down and alert Domino's. However, by the time Domino's Pizza could take any action, the video had gone viral, watched over by millions of disgusted consumers. The traditional news media was also quite quick to pick up the story and give wide publicity to the horrible incident.

Domino's Pizza found themselves in the classic disaster situation. The enormous shock value of the YouTube video coupled with extremely low controllability of the crisis made it the worst possible situation for Domino's. Their public relations (PR) machinery came into action almost immediately, calibrating their response with a YouTube video of Patrick Doyle, the President of Domino's USA.<sup>VIII</sup> In this video, Doyle first acknowledged that the two persons were indeed employees of Domino's franchisee. He then proceeded to describe what actions they had taken that far to correct the situation. The actions included, sterilizing the entire store, firing the two employees, and getting them arrested for contaminating food.

What made this crisis a disaster? First, the trigger, the YouTube video of the two Domino's employees doing disgusting things to the food and serving it to customers had a very high shock value. Many people eat at Domino's and it could happen to any of them. This realization was startling. Further, the vividness of tainting of the food was sickening. Watching someone doing such disgusting things to your food is extremely repulsive. Second, for Domino's the crisis was highly uncontrollable. This action by the two employees was suicidal and it was impossible to predict such a situation. That Domino's did not have a plan for such an extreme possibility is certainly not their fault. The sheer bizarreness of this crisis made it uncontrollable.

Domino's promised to be more cautious about their employment practices and vetting of the prospective employees but beyond that they could do little. They also tried to hammer the message that this was just one unfortunate event which doesn't represent how Domino's employees really behave. But once they responded, they could only hope for the situation not snowball into something bigger. In contrast to the United Airlines, Domino's Pizza faced a highly shocking social media crisis and experienced a major damage to their brand name. However, neither company was in a position to do much about it.

### **Social Media Crisis Response**



Usually, the response to a social media crisis can be suggested based on the standard crisis management literature. The three steps in crisis management involve prevention, response, and recovery. This chapter is more concerned about the second stage in the process, viz. recovery. I use the model suggested by Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) to focus on response in each of the four types of social media crises.

Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005) propose that the response can be divided into four sub processes: observation, interpretation, choice, and dissemination. Observation entails collecting all the relevant information at the onset of the crisis. Interpretation involves assessing information within the context of the current crisis to determine both its accuracy and its relevance. Choice involves assessing viability of different alternative actions and choosing the most appropriate among them. Finally, dissemination leads to information exchange with public. I discuss how four-step response can be applied to social media crises.

**Soft crises and firefighting:** For soft crisis and firefighting, I suggest implementing spiral crisis response communication model (Hale, Dulek, and Hale 2005). In this model, the four steps of the crisis communication—observation, interpretation, choice, and dissemination—are repeated one after another. Figure 2, reproduced from Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005), shows the spiral model. Such a model is most appropriate for the crises with high controllability. By actively engaging in the four steps, crisis can be managed more effectively and prevented from growing into a disaster.

**Wait and watch and disaster:** For the two crises situations where controllability is low, perhaps spiral communication model is redundant. By constantly changing the response based on the developments on various social media, an organization is likely to make the situation worse. Therefore, it is more appropriate to select a linear model that follows the above four steps in Hale, Dulek, and Hale (2005). After the information is disseminated to public, there may not be a need to actively keep on responding to the crisis as the organization doesn't control the crisis.

## Discussion

Social media crisis management is a nascent area. Currently no systematic research exists on how to categorize and manage social media crises. In this chapter I propose a typology of



social media crises. My typology divides crises along two dimensions: controllability and shock value of the trigger. I don't assert that this is the best typology for social media crises. While writing this chapter, I attempted several different typologies and found this one more useful. However, in the absence of any quantitative research, I claim neither superiority nor completeness of my proposed typology. Nonetheless, I hope that my writing will lead to more interest in researching a scientifically rigorous classification of social media crises.

I use several examples from the corporate world where big brands with large advertising and PR budgets bit the dust. The allure of social media makes many blind to the risks that come with their use. Again, I hope that this writing triggers more interest in assessing these risks better and providing managers a tool for estimating the return on social media investments (According imagens one and two of the text).

#### Notas:

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II <http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm>

III <http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/news/1112/gallery.dumbest-moments-2011/8.html>

IV <http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2011/12/22/data-composition-of-a-corporate-social-media-team/>

V <http://consumerist.com/2011/12/paypal-admits-the-regreetsy-donate-button-fiasco-should-never-have-happened-in-the-first-place.html>

VI Some of the responses by Kutcher can be found here - <http://hypervocal.com/news/2011/ashton-kutchers-tragically-misguided-wildly-hypocritical-joe-paterno-tweet/>

VII <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXZUXn8RJeA>

VIII <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXZUXn8RJeA>

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